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Taking Democracy Seriously
by
NEIL B. COHEN*
Like Henry Gabriel, I think I ought to lead with a statement of
possible conflicts of interest. I have been privileged to participate in
several of the commercial law drafting projects in the past decade. I
was the Reporter for the Restatement of Suretyship and Guaranty
and I was a member of the Article 9 Drafting Committee. As you
have heard, I am now the Reporter for UCC Article 1, and I am on
the reconstituted Drafting Committee for Articles 2 and 2A. I was
not, though, on the original Article 2 and 2A Drafting Committees.
Also, I am a member of the American Law Institute, but I am not a
Uniform Law Commissioner. I think it is fair to say that I am
probably completely free from the absence of bias about this process.
Also, I have many friends whom I'm likely to offend by these
remarks: so I'll just jump right in right now and offend everyone.
First of all, though, I should add a few more facts as background.
One is that my experiences as a Reporter, both for a Restatement and
for a UCC Article, have given me a deep appreciation of the very
significant differences between those two processes and the
differences in the preparation of those two products. I should also
add that in my experiences as a Reporter I've been very lucky, in
most respects, to be working on projects that have, for the most part,
come in below the radar of those who do the heavy-handed lobbying
of the sort that Dick [Speidel] and Linda [Rusch] experienced. This
isn't to say there has not been spirited debate in my projects, but the
debate has largely been a lawyer's debate about the right answers
rather than a lobbyist's debate. So I am laden with bias, and I invite
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you to take everything I say with a grain of salt-or perhaps a boulder
of it.
It is the recent experience with Article 2 that essentially gave rise
to this program, so I will start there. I will start, though, by disclosing
one more bias. That bias is that I like the policies that were
embodied in Dick and Linda's draft of Article 2 (the July 1999 draft).
I voted for it at the ALI, I generally supported its policies in the
endless harmonization meetings that Dick referred to, and, if I ran
the world, probably the bulk of the policies in that draft would be law.
Indeed, I would not even have to run the whole world; I would just
have to be empowered to make commercial law for it.
But I don't make the rules. Judges and legislators do. The last
time I looked, I do not have a black robe and I have not been elected
to any legislature. So, while my view of appropriate public policy is
quite important to me, and might lead me through amicus briefs or
communications to legislators to urge its adoption by those entrusted
to make law, again, I am not one of the entrusted. Indeed, not only
do I not have any legitimate political power of my own, I haven't even
been delegated any such power by those who do have legitimate
power to make public policy choices. It is something I try to
remember in this process.
It is probably a good thing that I don't have that power, at least
in the context of Article 2. Like most law professors, I have been a
buyer much more often then I have been a seller. I benefit from
warranty obligations, but I don't have to model anticipated
experiences with them to estimate the expected costs from living up
to them and assess the market benefits from choosing to bear those
obligations along with those costs. I am on a payroll, but I have never
had to meet one. And, while I am not personally litigious, I can assert
my rights at little or no cost for legal services, and I occasionally even
get paid by others to assist them in asserting their rights; I have never
had to view the corporate legal department's budget or the costs of
outside counsel while wearing a green eyeshade.
Moreover, when I conjure -up a hypothetical situation to help
myself determine what the rule ought to be in a particular case, I have
a tendency to make myself a player in the hypothetical. And the role
I assign to myself tends to reflect the experiences I have just
described. I am willing to admit that my conception of the "better
rule" that sometimes emerges from this exercise might well be
tainted, just a little bit, by rooting for me (I tend to like my
character). The result of this is some skepticism-skepticism about
just how important my own policy views are. They are quite
important to me, of course, but I do not view their failure to become
law, when they do fail, as a betrayal of the "right answer" that must
[Vol. 52HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
be adopted or necessarily as a sign that the process is somehow
tainted.
I suppose I was trained for this by presidential elections. I have
voted in eight presidential elections in my life, and I have not voted
for the winner in the majority of them. Except for the last one,
though, I would say that there was not much doubt that the process
was working even though my view did not prevail at the end. But,
other than telling you that I do not think the extent to which legal
initiatives replicate my views is necessarily a good measure of their
value, I haven't really told you much about what I think about the
current situation.
I think I really ought to introduce my views with a word that we
have not heard very much today-somewhat surprisingly I think.
That word is "democracy." I might add that I think democracy is a
good thing. One shouldn't have to say that, but at least some of what
has been said today suggests that democracy is something to be run
from and avoided and not be tainted by, rather than something that is
a positive good. It does not always work; it has its flaws; but I have
not yet seen a Plan B that works any better.
Democracy is the biggest difference between a Restatement and
a proposed Article of the UCC. As you all know, a Restatement is
neither mandatory nor self-executing. It becomes law solely by its
persuasive power, and, in a sense, by the visibility it enjoys by
standing on the shoulders of the giants who did the first
Restatements. While a Restatement is not considered successful if it
is not widely followed, it can gather that following over time; a split in
the States as to whether to follow a Restatement rule is not
considered a mark of failure.
Legislation, on the other hand, is the product of democracy, with
all its virtues and all its flaws. Majorities have to be assembled, and,
more importantly, proposed legislation needs supporters who care
enough about it to actually get it to the floor where it can be
determined if there is a majority supporting it; things do not just
automatically come to the floor of legislatures. For uniform law, as
opposed to regular old law, we need, essentially, consensus. Closely
divided decisions are likely to be decided differently by different
legislatures. If uniformity is valued-and that is a pretty big "if' that
we all ought to think about rather than assume-the existence of
different answers in different legislatures is not a good thing.
The result is that to achieve uniform legislation some common
denominators have to be sought. Now, I am not saying "lowest
common denominator," although sometimes it might be there. Keep
in mind, though, that sometimes the lowest common denominator is
still a pretty big number. Also remember, that a statute can fail for a
number of reasons. It can fail for saying too many things that people
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dislike. It can also fail for not saying enough good things. And it
needs the right balance in order to get enough support and enough of
a consensus.
In light of these realities, if the decision has been made (again,
that is a big "if,") to seek legal reform through uniform state
legislation, politics and democracy in all their glory are a necessary
part of the process. We should not profess surprise or shock when
that happens. Every time that happens I think of the line in
Casablanca, where the police commander professes to be shocked
upon discovering gambling at Rick's; that is about as shocked as we
should be at the presence of politics and democracy in our process.
We should not be shocked when uniform legislation that would
inspire lobbying efforts by interest groups in the legislatures inspires
similar efforts in the so-called private legislatures in which we all
participate, putting these products together.
In fact, there is some real advantage to having lobbying occur in
private legislatures such as Drafting Committees rather than in the
real legislatures. First, and I hesitate to say this, the interest groups
might actually be right sometimes. Even a stopped clock is right twice
a day, and sometimes the interest groups bring in things that we have
not heard before, things that we have missed. Without that input the
information would not come to our attention and the result is a better
product for that input. Also, whether or not the interest groups are
right, if they are successful at the drafting committee stage, they get
the benefit of the high-quality technical drafting that is the hallmark
of our projects. Whatever policies are adopted by the projects, it is
certainly a positive value to have them done well rather than poorly.
Finally, and this is the most difficult point and I will come back to it
later, by having this fighting occur at the drafting committee stage and
the private legislature stage, the proponents not only get a draft
statute but they also get a "seal of approval" from the sponsoring
organizations.
As Dick Speidel pointed out, though, not all action by interest
groups is positive in the sense that it seeks enactment of certain rules.
Much of it is negative, as in, "we will not let this draft be enacted; see
our ad in today's USA Today." Indeed it was this sort of lobbying
that ultimately killed Dick and Linda's draft of Article 2. And it is
this negative lobbying that has upset the proponents of that 1999 draft
the most, as it ought to. That draft was killed off in a way that was
quite harmful to the reputation. I should add that I am not referring
to the reputations of Dick and Linda (their reputations soared when
that happened); it was the reputation of the National Conference that
suffered. The draft was killed off through a cover story that was, shall
we say, not very credible. Those of you who were present remember
that it was simply announced that there was not enough floor time to
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openly discuss the issues and that, therefore, Article 2 was not going
to be discussed anymore. At the same meeting in which the
Conference promulgated UCITA1 over significant opposition, it
killed Article 2, because of its significant opposition. Those two
decisions, juxtaposed in the same week, did not exactly put the
Conference in its best light. And, unfortunately, that is not a good
thing. Anything diminishing the reputation of one of the UCC
sponsors is not good for the UCC. Even if one agrees with the
decision made by the Conference, I think one ought to regret the
result.
Yet, as much as the decision may have been handled in a way
that was not good from a public relations standpoint, the Conference
may in fact have made the correct decision not to go forward. I say
"may" because I honestly don't know the answer. But if, in fact, the
opposition would have prevented enactment in many states, the
uniformity goal of the UCC would obviously have suffered. If the
opposition would have prevented enactment in most states, the
project not only 'would have been a waste of the sponsoring
organizations' time and money, as well as the time devoted by the
Reporters and drafting committee members, but it would have been a
serious blow to the UCC as a whole. The failure of any part of the
UCC damages all future UCC projects by robbing them of the aura of
inevitability that often surrounds them when they get to the
legislatures.
This would be harmful to both sponsoring organizations-
particularly harmful to the National Conference because the UCC is,
in many ways, the crowning glory of the National Conference. Many
products of the National Conference have been widely enacted.
Many have not. None has been as successful as the UCC. The failure
would be a harm to the ALI as well, although perhaps somewhat less
so. The ALI's reputation is likely to be based, for the foreseeable
future, on the Restatements.
So, if the Conference leadership assessed the situation correctly,
their decision to not go forward might well have been the correct one.
That's a big "if." They may have gotten it wrong. The
opponents could have been bluffing, making empty threats with the
hope of extorting a better deal, or they may not have had the ability
to prevent enactment in the states. I don't know. Certainly the
Conference leadership has much more experience in assessing these
matters than I do, and I don't care to second-guess them. I do know,
though, that this action has emboldened other groups to use the
threat of opposition to seek more favorable rules, and we're paying
the price of that in the Article 2 process right now.
1. UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT (1999).
March 2001] TAKING DEMOCRACY SERIOUSLY
If, indeed, though, the Conference made an accurate political
assessment with respect to Article 2 and, thus, made the right
decision-again, putting aside how it was handled from internal
decision-making or public relations standpoints-what should happen
next? The two obvious choices are to do nothing or to produce
something more enactable.
My colleague Ted Janger, in a wonderful article in the Iowa Law
Review 2-I can tell him it's wonderful because I also tell him I
disagree with about three quarters of it every time I talk with him
about it-analyzes this latter phenomenon of producing something
more enactable under the label of "preemptive capture." It is not so
much that the Drafting Committees and the sponsoring organization
have been captured themselves, as that they anticipate capture by the
legislatures and try to match that capture. Now, he meant that
pejoratively, but I am not so sure it's necessarily a bad thing. After
all, producing in pretty good technical form what the democratic
process can ultimately enact is only bad if we presume that we know
that the answer that is acceptable to the democratic process is bad
and should not become law despite its democratic support. I do not
think we should reach such a conclusion casually.
But there are times that we can, should, reach that conclusion.
Why? Because the ALI and the Conference are not just state
legislative drafting services that merely put the ideas of others in
proper statutory form. Products of the ALI and the Conference carry
a sort of Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval. This seal of approval
is not only for technical formulation, but also for acceptable policy.
As a result, when we put together these projects, I think we
should be quite consciously serving two masters. We should
simultaneously be seeking excellent law and enactable law. The
former without the latter is merely a big self-indulgent law review
article (not that I have anything against self-indulgent law review
articles). But the latter without the former comes uncomfortably
close to intellectual prostitution, and that, obviously, is not a good
thing.
Kathleen Patchel opened her very impressive article3 on the
UCC drafting process several years ago with a quotation from Karl
Llewellyn in which he suggested that the work of drafting the UCC
2. See generally Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will
Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569 (1998).
3. See generally Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the
Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L.
REV. 83 (1993).
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would be largely technical rather than policy-laden.4 Maybe he was
just being disingenuous. The other possibility is he was just plain
wrong. Because, of course, the technical aspects and the policy
aspects are inseparable. We have to remember that; and the two
sponsoring organizations should not put their seal of approval on any
products they would not want associated with their names-that goes
for both technical competence and policy.
So, what conclusion does this lead us to in terms of Article 2? In
light of the history of the last two years, I think we must carefully
examine the product that is going to come out of the Drafting
Committee for which Henry is the Reporter and on which I serve. It
should really be a multi-faceted examination. The product should be
tested against some absolute norms-it should be good law and it
should be enactable law-but also there should be a comparative
analysis.
I do not think, though, the proper basis of comparison is Dick
and Linda's draft. For better or for worse, that draft is gone and is
not likely to come back any time soon.
I think that what is in the new draft ought to be compared with
two benchmarks. One benchmark is current law-is the draft better
than current law? The second, as Dick and others have mentioned, is
opportunity cost. What is the opportunity cost of foregoing what we
might produce if we do nothing now, and instead wait a few more
years to perhaps find a more propitious moment?
This is where it is important to note that Article 2 is different
from the rest of the UCC. Article 2 has always been the oddball in
the UCC. Most of the rest of the UCC deals substantially with third-
party rights with respect to a transaction, or is concerned with
maintaining efficient systems, like wire transfer systems, for
standardized terms. Article 2 is neither. It deals almost exclusively
with completing incomplete contracts and as everyone has noted,
tends to provide somewhat fuzzy norms. The result is an Article that
is different than all the others. The other Articles tend to- answer our
questions, Article 2 tells us what question we should have asked.
That is a very different function.
It is a function that the common law performs also, and tends to
perform pretty well. While the common law rules and the Article 2
rules are often quite different, we cannot really say that the common
law is a failure. So, if through obsolescence Article 2 withers to
irrelevance without being replaced or updated, the social cost will be
4. "There is a very considerable body of commercial law which is very largely non-
political in character, and which can be put into shape to be flexibly permanent." Karl
Llewellyn, quoted in Patchel, supra note 4, at 83.
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significantly less than if the same thing happened to Article 8 or
Article 9.
I am not saying the common law does a better job: Dean Scott
will be talking about that. I am making the more modest claim that
Article 2 may be a bit less essential in 2001 than we like to think. It
certainly was a great advance in the 1950s and 1960s, but it is not
necessarily true that we need that advance today.
So "do nothing" may not be as bad a choice for Article 2 as it
might be in the case of another UCC Article. Accordingly, the
sponsoring organizations, both of them, can afford high standards in
assessing the new Article 2 draft. I am not counseling against its
approval-far from it. I am on the Drafting Committee and I am
convinced that it represents an improvement over current law, even if
its policies aren't as much to my liking as the 1999 draft that Dick and
Linda prepared. But, since the cost of doing nothing is low, the
opportunity cost of not waiting until a better time should play a large
role in the decisions.
What does this say about other UCC projects? I am guardedly
optimistic but I would make a couple of suggestions for
improvements in the process when other Articles are being
considered. First, Drafting Committees should listen to the demands
of interest groups, but they should also remember the difference
between demands and needs, and realize that most interest groups
are not particularly sensitive formulators of proposals that fulfill their
needs-even when their needs are legitimate. The interest groups
tend to be indifferent at best to the harm that their proposals wreak
on others, and they typically describe their proposals as demands and
fail to articulate clearly the concerns that give rise to those proposals.
But if a Drafting Committee can force itself to see behind those
demands, to reach and see the often legitimate needs that are lurking
behind them, it can draft rules that meet those needs but do not cause
the same level of harm that satisfying the demands might cause.
Moreover, if this is done well, very often the unreasonable demands
ease or disappear. I think this is something we don't do often enough,
and we should do more. This is something also that is more likely to
be successful early, rather than late, in the process.
I think, secondly, that the ALI and the Conference should openly
acknowledge their different perspectives on the law creation process
in which we are all involved, and celebrate those differences rather
than becoming frustrated by them, as is often the case these days. As
many have said, the ALI's institutional perspective is to try to devise
the right rule, not necessarily the best rule. There can be lots of
"rights," but there can only be one "best." But the ALI certainly tries
to at least get a rule that is right. There is recognition within the ALI
of the difference between right and best, and that it might have to
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settle for second best for reasons of enactability, but the prime focus
is on getting it right.
The Conference, on the other hand, not only has to deal with
enactability, but some might say enactability is its primary focus and
that the Conference seeks the best possible rule within that
constraint. I leave it to all of you to decide whether that
characterization is correct. But these two different roles and these
two different perspectives of the two organizations are
complementary, and not antagonistic. Both of those focuses should
be served if we are to produce law that we are proud of. More open
discussion of these different perspectives and the different directions
that they might lead us in will, I think, serve us all well.
I think the process points raised by Gail Hillebrand are good and
should be followed for the most part. I think that they would, in fact,
benefit the process. I think that Lance Liebman's five questions must
be addressed, and addressed openly. Some of us may claim that we
implicitly think about them all the time, but implicit thinking doesn't
really do the job here. Unless you debate something openly you do
not really get a full range of views.
Henry Gabriel's view that good law bothers everyone, or ought
to bother everyone, may well be true. After all, a balance of
dissatisfaction may in fact produce equilibrium. Those of you who
remember high school physics, though, may remember that a
pendulum has two equilibrium points. There is the one at the bottom,
and there is the one at the top. The one at the top is what is called an
unstable equilibrium, because if you push the pendulum a little bit it
goes careening pretty far away, while the one at the bottom is a stable
equilibrium-if you push the pendulum away it will come right back.
I think that there may be a lesson in that for us here as well. It is a lot
easier to maintain that equilibrium at the bottom than it is at the top,
but we want to be striving for that equilibrium at the top of the
pendulum rather than the bottom.
Where does that leave us? I think, at the present time, that what
we ought to do is to keep putting one foot in front of the other-go
through the journey, do the best we can, be more sensitive, perhaps,
than we have been in the past to a lot of issues we have tended to
gloss over, and not lose sight of the goal of the enterprise, which, of
course, is bringing about good law.
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